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1. Introduction  
A commonly held view among economists is that, in the absence of efficiency gains, 
horizontal mergers between oligopolistic firms raise prices.1 But recent works by Froeb, et al. 
(2003) and Higgins, et al. (2004) challenge this view.  In particular, Froeb, et al. (2003) conduct 
numerical simulations of a merger model with price competition among capacity-constrained 
firms, and they find that “[i]n the case where the merged firm is capacity-constrained, there is no 
merger price effect.”  To be more specific, they show that, although the capacity constraints on 
the non-merging firms drive up post-merger prices as has long been believed, the capacity 
constraints on the merging firms depress post-merger prices, and the latter effect is greater than 
the former. When both merging firms are capacity constrained, a merger has simply zero effect 
on price, quantity, consumer surplus and total welfare.  Extending the approach of Froeb, et al. 
(2003), Higgins, et al. (2004) reaffirms this finding in a more elaborate computation model. 
This finding has siginficant implications for competition policy towards mergers.  If a 
merger has no price effect whenever the merging firms are capacity constrained, this would 
provide antitrust authorities with a simple test to screen out a class of mergers that are not 
expected to cause any harm to competition.  This test would be very useful because capacity 
constraints are ubiquitous in reality.  For example, the output that a manufacturer can produce 
during any given period is constrained by the size of its plants, and the maximum number of 
guests that a hotel can accommodate in a given night is determined by the number and capacity 
of rooms it has.  Indeed, it can be argued that in the short run firms in every industry face 
capacity constraints; the difference is that the capacity constraints may be tighter in some 
                                                 
1 For theoretical demonstrations of this point, see, for example, Salant, et al. (1983), Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985), McAfee, et al. (1992), Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990).  
Empirically, Weinberg (2008) surveys the literature on the price effects of horizontal mergers, and finds 
that prices increased after a merger in the majority of cases that have been examined.  
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industries than in others.  However, before this finding of Froeb, et al. (2003) can be applied 
with confidence to merger enforcement, its robustness must be assessed.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate the price effects of merger in the presence of 
capacity constraints using an analytical model (as opposed to numerical simulations). 
Specifically, we analyze a merger between two competitors in the familiar Bertrand-Edgeworth 
model, where 𝑛  symmetric firms produce a homogeneous product and they set prices 
simultaneously taking into consideration their capacity constraints.  
Our analysis identifies the conditions under which a merger does or does not have price 
effects in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model.  Specifically, we show that the characteristics of the 
equilibriums and accordingly the effects of the merger depend on the pre-merger capacity level 
of each firm.  If the capacity level is either very low or very high, firms play pure strategies in 
equilibrium both before and after the merger.  In this case, the merger has no effect on the 
equilibrium prices, as in Froeb, et al. (2003).  If the capacity level is in the intermediate range, 
however, a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs and higher prices prevail after the merger.  To be 
more specific, in the case where the merger turns a pure strategy equilibrium into a mixed 
strategy equilibrium, the range of post-merger prices is strictly higher than the pre-merger prices.  
In the case where a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs both before and after the merger, 
moreover, the support of the price distributions shifts rightward after the merger and the 
post-merger price distribution of each firm stochastically dominates its pre-merger counterpart.  
Consequently, the merger enables every firm (including the merged entity) to earn a larger profit 
whenever a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails after the merger. 
Therefore, our analysis demonstrates a number of possible scenarios for a merger in markets 
where firms face capacity constraints.  For the merger to have no price effect, it is not sufficient 
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that the merged firm faces a capacity constraint; this capacity constraint and the counterparts of 
all other firms have to be binding both before and after the merger.  Binding capacity 
constraints before the merger does not necessarily mean that they will remain binding after the 
merger.  The merger can turn a binding capacity constraint into a slack one.  On the other 
hand, in situations where the capacity is so large that all firms charge a price equaling marginal 
cost in the pre-merger equilibrium, the merger (which merely combines the capacity of two firms 
without changing the aggregate level of capacity) can cause the equilibrium price to rise above 
the marginal cost.  The implication of these findings is that in industries where capacity 
constraints are a significant factor, the tightness of these constraints plays an important role in 
determining the effects of a merger.   
There is a sizeable literature on the effects of horizontal mergers in Cournot and Bertrand 
models of oligopoly.  It is now well known that in the absence of efficiency gains, mergers 
under Cournot competition are often unprofitable (i.e., the “merger paradox”).2  On the other 
hand,  a number of authors (Deneckere and Davidson 1985, Braid 1986 and 1999, Reitzes and 
Levy 1990, and Levy and Reitzes 1992) have shown that a merger raises prices and is more 
profitable for the merging firms when firms produce differentiated products and compete in 
prices (i.e., under Bertrand competition). 
Surprisingly, very few authors have studied the effects of merger in the Bertrand-Edgeworth 
model despite its prominence in the oligopoly theory.3  Our literature search has uncovered 
only two such studies, namely Davidson and Deneckere (1984) and Hirata (2009). Davidson and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Salant, et al. (1983), and Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).  A number of authors, 
including Perry and Porter (1985), McAfee, et al. (1992) and Daughety (1990), have studied various ways 
to resolve the merger paradox. 
3 Notable analyses of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model include Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Allen and 
Hellwig (1986), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a and 1986b), Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and Vives (1986) . 
More recently, Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2009 and 2010) investigate the case of 
asymmetric firms in more general settings. 
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Deneckere (1984) study the impact of merger on tacit collusion in a Cournot model and a 
Bertrand-Edgeworth model with a linear demand function. Hirata (2009) contains a brief 
analysis on the possibility that a merger could be unprofitable when firms face capacity 
constraints.  Neither of them, however, directly studies the price effect of merger when firms 
act independently (i.e., the unilateral effect of merger).        
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A Bertrand-Edgeworth model with 𝑛 
symmetric firms is presented in section 2, while the equilibrium in this model is analyzed in 
section 3.  The effects of a merger between two firms are investigated in section 4.  Section 5 
concludes.     
2. Bertrand-Edgeworth Model 
Consider an industry with 𝑛 (≥ 3) symmetric firms that produce a homogeneous good. The 
marginal cost of production is normalized to zero and there is no fixed cost.  Each firm has a 
production capacity of 𝐾; in other words, the output of each firm cannot exceed 𝐾.  Firms 
compete by setting their prices simultaneously.  
The market demand for the good is represented by the function 𝑄 = 𝐷(𝑝).  Then the 
demand at the price equal to marginal cost is 𝐷(0), which is assumed to be a finite number.  As 
is common in the literature on the Bertrand-Edgeworth model (e.g., Vives 1986, Hirata 2009, De 
Francesco and Salvadori 2009), we assume that 𝐷(∙)  is decreasing, concave and twice 
continuously differentiable.  These assumptions imply that 𝑝𝐷(∙) is strictly concave in 𝑝.   
Let 𝑃(𝑄) = 𝐷−1(𝑄) denote the corresponding inverse demand function. The assumptions 
on 𝐷(∙) then imply that the inverse demand function satisfies 𝑃′(𝑄) < 0 and 𝑃′′(𝑄) ≤ 0. 
In this model, firms may charge different prices.  Consumers will want to buy from 
whichever firm that offers the lowest price. However, when the demand for a firm’s product 
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exceeds its capacity, consumers have to be rationed.  We follow the common approach in the 
literature, and assume the efficient rationing rule under which the output of the lowest-price 
firms is sold first to consumers with the highest valuation.4  Accordingly, if firm 𝑗 offers the 
lowest price 𝑝𝑗 but cannot satisfy 𝐷�𝑝𝑗� due to its capacity constraint, the residual demand 
facing the firm offering the second lowest price 𝑝𝑖 is given by 𝐷(𝑝𝑖) − 𝐾𝑗.  In the symmetric 
case where all 𝑛 firms have the same capacity 𝐾, a firm charging the hth lowest price faces the 
residual demand of max{0,𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (ℎ − 1)𝐾}.  Moreover, if several firms charge the same 
price, the residual demand is shared among the equally-priced firms in proportion to their 
capacities.   
An important element in the analysis of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model is the Cournot 
best-response function. Define 𝑞𝑖�∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 � as firm 𝑖’s Cournot best-response function when all 
of its rivals produce at their capacity levels.  In other words, 𝑞𝑖�∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 � is solved from firm 
i’s first-order condition 
𝑃�𝑞𝑖 + �𝐾𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
� + 𝑞𝑖𝑃′ �𝑞𝑖 + �𝐾𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
� = 0.                              (1)  
By definition, 𝑞𝑖�∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 �  represents firm i’s profit-maximizing output level when all other 
firms produce at full capacity.  This implies that, under price competition, firm i will have no 
incentive to undercut its rivals’ prices if its capacity is smaller than 𝑞𝑖�∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 �.  
From (1), it is easy to derive the slope of the firm’s Cournot best-response function:     
𝑑𝑞𝑖
𝑑 ∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖
= − 𝑃′ + 𝑞𝑖𝑃′′2𝑃′ + 𝑞𝑖𝑃′′  .                                         (2)    
                                                 
4 The efficient rationing rule is used in Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), 
Davidson and Deneckere (1984), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), Vives (1986), Hirata (2009), and De 
Francesco and Salvadori (2009). 
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Using the properties of the inverse demand function, we can verify that the value of (2) falls in 
the interval (−1, 0).  In other words, the Cournot best-response curve is downward-sloping 
with (the absolute value of) the slope less than 1.      
3. Pre-Merger Equilibrium 
Our objective is to investigate the effects of a merger between two firms.  We will achieve 
this by comparing the equilibriums before and after the merger.  Before the merger, there are 𝑛 
symmetric firms, each with a capacity 𝐾. The equilibrium in such a situation has been studied 
by Vives (1986).  Below we reproduce some of his results that are relevant for our later 
analysis.   
It is well-known in this literature that depending on the firms’ capacity levels, an equilibrium 
in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model may involve mixed strategies.  We will start by 
characterizing the critical levels of capacity 𝐾 that separate a mixed strategy equilibrium and a 
pure strategy equilibrium.   
It is shown in Vives (1986) that there are two such critical levels of 𝐾. The first one is 
𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 1), where 𝐷(0) is the quantity demanded at the price equal to marginal cost.  If 
the capacity level of each firm is so large that 𝐾 ≥ 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 1), each firm chooses 𝑝 = 0 
and earns zero profit in equilibrium.  In other words, we have the classic Bertrand equilibrium 
where the price equals marginal cost.   
To introduce the second critical level of 𝐾, note that the solution to (1), the Cournot 
best-response function, can now be written in the form 𝑞𝑖((𝑛 − 1)𝐾).  Let 𝐾� denote the 
solution to 𝐾� = 𝑞𝑖((𝑛 − 1)𝐾�).  It is proven by Vives (1986) that there is a pure strategy 
equilibrium if the capacity of each firm is so small that 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�.  In this equilibrium, every firm 
charges the price 𝑃(𝑛𝐾), produces at full capacity 𝐾, and earns a profit 𝐾𝑃(𝑛𝐾). 
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A mixed strategy equilibrium occurs if 𝐾 is in the intermediate range, i.e. if  𝐾� < 𝐾 <
𝐷(0 ) (𝑛 − 1⁄ ).   Let 𝐹(𝑝) denote the equilibrium mixed strategy of a firm; that is, 𝐹(𝑝) =Pr (𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑝) is the probability of firm 𝑖 charging a price lower than 𝑝.  To put it differently, 
𝐹(𝑝) is the cumulative distribution function of the firm’s equilibrium prices.  Let [𝑝𝑙 ,𝑝ℎ] be 
the support of 𝐹(𝑝) and 𝜋 the firm’s expected profit in equilibrium.  Then Proposition 1 in 
Vives (1986) implies that  
𝑝ℎ = argmax𝑝 𝑝[𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾], 𝑝𝑙 = 𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾]𝐾 .                  (3) 
𝐹(𝑝) =  � (𝑝 − 𝑝𝑙)𝐾
𝑝[𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)]�1 (𝑛−1)⁄ , 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑙𝐾 = 𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾].                (4) 
From (3) we can verify that 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) < 𝑝𝑙 < 𝑝ℎ < 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾). That is, the support of 
equilibrium price distribution is bounded by 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) and 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾).  Moreover, it can be 
shown that as n increases, 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑝ℎ fall and thus the range of equilibrium prices (𝑝𝑙,𝑝ℎ) 
shifts toward the left.  Intuitively, an increase in the number of firms (and a larger total 
production capacity) intensifies competition, thus reducing the price and the profit of every firm.  
Similarly, an increase in K reduces both 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑝ℎ and causes the range of equilibrium prices 
to shift leftward.  This is not surprising since firms compete more aggressively when they have 
larger production capacity.  
For ease of later discussion, we summarize the pre-merger equilibrium as follows. 
Lemma 1: Before the merger, 
   (i)  a pure strategy equilibrium where each firm sets 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) prevails if 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�. 
   (ii)  a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails if 𝐾� < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 1). 
   (iii)  a pure strategy equilibrium where each firm sets 𝑝𝑖 = 0  prevails if 𝐾 ≥
𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 1). 
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The proofs of this and all remaining lemmas and propositions are relegated to the appendix. 
4. Effects of Merger 
Suppose firms 1 and 2 merge to form a new entity M while the other firms remain 
unchanged.  The merger leads to an oligopoly market where one firm has a capacity twice as 
large as that of a remaining firm.  This means that firms are no longer symmetric.  
This asymmetry creates challenges for the equilibrium analysis because it is generally 
difficult to obtain a complete characterization of mixed strategy equilibriums in the 
Bertrand-Edgeworth model with more than three asymmetric firms (De Francesco and Salvadori 
2009).  Fortunately, our model involves a very special situation where only one firm has the 
largest capacity and all remaining firms have the same capacity.  To further simplify analysis, 
we focus on equilibriums in which firms with the same capacity choose the same strategy.  In 
the case of a mixed strategy equilibrium, for example, all non-merging firms (i.e., firms 3 
through n) adopt the same price distribution.   
Despite these simplifications, the derivations involving mixed strategy equilibriums are still 
quite long and tedious.  For this reason, we relegate most of the technical details to the 
appendix.       
For ease of discussion, we will follow the convention of referring to firms 1 and 2 as the 
“insiders” and the remaining firms as the “outsiders”.  Note that the combined capacity of all 
outsiders is (𝑛 − 2)𝐾.   Thus, the Cournot best-response function of the merged firm M is 
𝑞𝑀�(𝑛 − 2)𝐾�.   Let 𝐾𝑀 denote the capacity of firm M.  Then 𝐾𝑀 = 2𝐾.   
Lemma 2: There exists a unique 𝐾�𝑀  such that 𝐾�𝑀 = 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾�𝑀/2) , and that 𝐾𝑀 ≤
𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾𝑀/2) if and only if 𝐾𝑀 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀.                                                                    
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Lemma 2 determines a critical level of firm M’s capacity above which its capacity exceeds 
its Cournot best-response output when all outsiders produce at full capacity.  This, in turn, helps 
define one of the two thresholds of 𝐾 that separate pure strategy equilibriums and mixed 
strategy equilibriums.  The other threshold is 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2). 
Lemma 3: After the merger, 
   (i)   a pure strategy equilibrium where each firm sets 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑛𝐾)  prevails if 
𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ . 
   (ii)   a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails if 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2). 
   (iii)  a pure strategy equilibrium where each firm sets 𝑝𝑖 = 0  prevails if 𝐾 ≥
𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2). 
 From Lemma 3, we see that qualitatively the post-merger equilibriums are the same as the 
pre-merger equilibriums.  Specifically, a pure strategy equilibrium prevails if 𝐾 is either very 
large or very small, but a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs if 𝐾 is in the intermediate range.  
For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to note that the critical values of 𝐾 that 
separate the pure strategy equilibriums from the mixed strategy equilibriums are different before 
and after the merger.  It is easy to see that 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ > 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ .  This implies that 
if 𝐾  falls between 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄  and 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , the merger turns a pure strategy 
equilibrium into a mixed strategy equilibrium.  On the other hand, a careful comparison of 𝐾�𝑀 
and 𝐾� reveals the following. 
Lemma 4: 𝐾�𝑀 < 2𝐾�. 
Lemmas 3 and 4 then imply that the merger reduces the equilibrium range of 𝐾 for which 
every firm sets 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) and produces at its full capacity, from (0,𝐾�) to (0,𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ ).  
Intuitively, this arises because the merger decreases the insiders’ (combined) Cournot 
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best-response output from 2𝐾�  to 𝐾�𝑀 .  It is well-known in the literature on the 
Bertrand-Edgeworth model that, in the case where firms have different levels of capacity, the 
occurrence of the pure strategy equilibrium is determined by the firm with the largest capacity 
(De Francesco and Salvadori 2009).  This pure strategy equilibrium would arise as long as the 
firm’s capacity is below its Cournot best-response output when all other firms produce at full 
capacity.  In our model, firm M has the largest capacity after the merger.  Lemma 4 implies 
that the Cournot best-response output of firm M does not increase by the same proportion as its 
capacity.  This reduces the critical value of 𝐾 under which the pure strategy equilibrium 
occurs.  
0 KD(0)/(n - 2)D(0)/(n - 1)~ /KM 2 ~K
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Lemmas 1–4 suggest that, in terms of the characteristics of the pre- and post-merger 
equilibriums, there are a total of five different cases.  As shown in Figure 1, a pure strategy 
equilibrium prevails before and after the merger if 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ .  The same is true if 𝐾 ≥
𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ .  A pure strategy equilibrium before the merger becomes a mixed strategy 
equilibrium after the merger if 𝐾�𝑀/2 < 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾� , or if 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ ≤ 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ .  
Finally, a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails before and after the merger if 𝐾� < 𝐾 <
𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ . 
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Next, we investigate how the merger affects the equilibrium prices.  We can divide the five 
cases in Figure 1 into two sets.  In the first set, a pure strategy equilibrium prevails both before 
and after the merger.  In the second set, a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs after the merger.  
It turns out the effects of the merger are very different for these two sets of cases.    
Proposition 1:  If 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄  or 𝐾 ≥ 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , a pure strategy equilibrium prevails 
before and after the merger, and the merger has no effect on equilibrium prices.   
As stated in Proposition 1, the first set of cases arise when the capacity level is either 
sufficiently large (𝐾 ≥ 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2)) or sufficiently small (𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ ).  The case of large 
capacity is not very interesting.  It involves a situation where the capacity levels of all firms are 
so large that the classic Bertrand equilibrium (where the price equals marginal cost) prevails 
before and after the merger.  This can be seen mostly clearly when there are three firms before 
the merger (𝑛 = 3).  Here a sufficiently large capacity means that 𝐾 ≥ 𝐷(0), i.e., every firm 
has enough capacity to serve the entire market.  Thus, we have the standard Bertrand 
competition among firms that drives the price down to the marginal cost both before and after the 
merger.  
In the case where 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀/2, the capacity level of every firm is so small that capacity 
constraint of every firm is binding both before and after the merger.  Consequently, each firm 
produces at full capacity and the equilibrium price is pinned down at 𝑃(𝑛𝐾), which is above the 
marginal cost.  Since the merger does not change the total capacity of all firms (𝑛𝐾), it has no 
effect on equilibrium prices.   
The equilibrium in this case of small capacity is consistent with the finding by Froeb, et al. 
(2003 p59) that “[i]n the case where the merged firm is capacity-constrained, there is no merger 
price effect.”  It should be emphasized that for a merger to have no price effect, the capacity 
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constraints must be binding both before and after the merger.  The latter, however, does not 
always hold.  As will be elaborated below, there are instances where the capacity constraints are 
binding before the merger but they become slack after the merger.5   
In the second set of cases, the post-merger equilibriums involve mixed strategies. This occurs 
if 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2).  Let 𝐹𝑀(𝑝) and 𝐹𝑂(𝑝) denote a mixed strategy of firm M 
and each outsider, respectively. It can be shown that these two distributions have the same 
support in equilibrium.  Let 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝𝐿 denote the supremum and infimum of the equilibrium 
price distribution.  Then in equilibrium, 𝐹𝑀(𝑝) and 𝐹𝑂(𝑝) are continuous and increasing 
functions over the range (𝑝𝐿 ,𝑝𝐻). 
Using the standard argument of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, we obtain the supremum and 
infimum of the price support as follows: 
𝑝𝐻 = argmax𝑝 𝑝[𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾],                                         (5) 
𝑝𝐿 = 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾]min {2𝐾,   𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} .                                                        (6) 
Conditions (5) and (6) imply that 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) < 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝𝐻 < 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾).  In other words, in a 
mixed strategy equilibrium after the merger, the equilibrium prices will not go below 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) or 
above 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾).  Note that 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) is the price in a pure strategy equilibrium where every 
firm produces at full capacity, while 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) would be the price if all outsiders produce at 
full capacity but firm M produces nothing.   
                                                 
5 This is in contrary to the belief of Froeb, et al. (2003 p59), who state, “If firms are capacity-constrained, 
they are pricing where potential demand equals capacity. This pricing calculus is less likely to be changed 
by merger.” Our Proposition 2 below shows that the merger does change the pricing calculus because it 
alters the tightness of the capacity constraints.  
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The second set consists of three cases.  First, in the case where 𝐾�𝑀/2 < 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�, the merger 
turns a pure strategy equilibrium into a mixed strategy equilibrium.  Since the equilibrium price 
before the merger is 𝑃(𝑛𝐾), it follows from 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) that the merger leads to higher prices.   
Proposition 2: If 𝐾�𝑀/2 < 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�, a pure strategy equilibrium before the merger changes to a 
mixed strategy equilibrium after the merger where the range of equilibrium prices are 
strictly higher than the pre-merger price 𝑃(𝑛𝐾).  
One interesting observation from Proposition 2 is that in the case where the capacity 
constraints are binding (i.e., all firms produce at full capacity) in the pre-merger equilibrium, the 
merger can relax the tightness of the constraints.  Since 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾), the total quantity 
produced by all firms in the mixed strategy equilibrium after the merger is less than 𝑛𝐾.  In 
other words, the quantities of firm M and the outsiders are distributed over a range below their 
respective capacity levels.  This, in turn, allows them to charge higher prices after the merger. 
Second, in the case where 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ ≤ 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , the merger also turns a pure 
strategy equilibrium before the merger into a mixed strategy equilibrium after the merger.  The 
difference is that the capacity levels of the firms are so large that the price is drive down to the 
marginal cost in the pre-merger equilibrium.  The merger raises the equilibrium prices in the 
sense that the range of post-merger prices is strictly above the marginal cost. 
Proposition 3: If 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ ≤ 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ , the Bertrand equilibrium before the 
merger changes to a mixed strategy equilibrium after the merger where the range of 
equilibrium prices are strictly above the marginal cost.  
Proposition 3 is interesting in that the merger merely combines the capacity of two firms 
without affecting the aggregate level of capacity in this market.  Yet while this capacity level is 
large enough to drive the pre-merger equilibrium price to the marginal cost, the combination of 
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capacity by the two firms changes the characteristics of the equilibrium and causes the prices of 
all firms to rise.       
Third, if 𝐾 is in the intermediate range where 𝐾� < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ , a mixed strategy 
equilibrium prevails before and after the merger.  Compared with the two cases discussed 
above, assessing the price effects of the merger in this case is much more difficult.  
Nevertheless, we are able to obtain the following results.  
Proposition 4: If 𝐾� < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ , a mixed strategy equilibrium prevails before and 
after the merger.  Moreover,  
(i) The range of equilibrium prices shifts toward the right after the merger, that is, 
𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝ℎ and 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑝𝑙. 
(ii) The post-merger price distributions 𝐹𝑀  and 𝐹𝑂  strictly dominate pre-merger 
price distribution F stochastically at first order.  In other words, every firm has 
strictly greater probability to sell below any particular price (except at 𝑝𝐻) before 
the merger than after the merger.  
Proposition 4 suggests that the price increase caused by the merger in this case can be viewed 
from two perspectives.  First, the equilibrium prices are randomized over a range of higher 
values after the merger.  Second, both the insiders and outsiders are more likely to charge 
higher prices after the merger.  
The impact of the merger on profits can be determined by using Propositions 1–4. It is 
obvious that the merger has no impact on a firm’s profit if it does not cause any change in 
equilibrium prices, i.e., if 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀 2⁄  or 𝐾 ≥ 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 2)⁄ .  If the merger changes the prices 
(as in Propositions 2–4), the higher prices tend to raise the profits of firm M and each outside 
firms.  But as a firm charges a higher price, it may sell a smaller quantity.  This effect is 
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particularly acute for firm M because, as the firm with the largest capacity, it tends to be 
undercut by the other firms.  Nevertheless, we are able to show that the merger is profitable for 
all firms including firm M.  
Proposition 5: The merger raises the profits of both the insiders and outsiders whenever it has a 
price effect, i.e. whenever 𝐾 is in the range (𝐾�𝑀 2⁄ ,𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2)).     
 Therefore, the effects of the merger on prices and profits depend on the pre-merger capacity 
level of each firm.  If the capacity level is either very low or very high, the merger has no 
impact on prices or profits.  For the capacity level in the intermediate range, the merger causes 
higher prices and improves the profitability of both the insiders and outsiders.      
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the effects of a merger between two firms in a Bertrand-Edgeworth 
model.  We have shown that the merger has no effect on prices or profits if the production 
capacity of each firm is either sufficiently small or sufficiently large that a pure strategy 
equilibrium prevails both before and after the merger.  If the capacity is in the intermediate 
range, however, a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs after the merger, in which case the merger 
raises the prices and improves the profitability of all firms.  In the case where a mixed strategy 
equilibrium prevails both before and after the merger, the post-merger price distribution of each 
firm stochastically dominates its pre-merger counterpart.   
A couple of assumptions in our model are particularly worth noting.  First, we have 
assumed that all firms have the same capacity before the merger.  This has simplified our 
analysis by substantially reducing the number of possible cases we have to consider.  At the 
same time, it probably has eliminated some forces that may be at play when firms are 
asymmetric.  Second, we have used a standard Bertrand-Edgeworth model where all firms 
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produce a homogeneous product.  Allowing product differentiation will likely influence the 
effects of a merger. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have shown that a merger leads to higher 
prices when firms produce differentiated products.  It will be interesting to investigate whether 
the presence of capacity constraints strengthens or mitigates this price effect.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: It follows from Proposition 1 in Vives (1986).  ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 2: Firm M’s Cournot best-response function 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) is the solution to max𝑞𝑞𝑃(𝑞 + (𝑛 − 2)𝐾).  Using (2), we obtain  
𝑑𝑞𝑀
𝑑𝐾
= −(𝑛 − 2) 𝑃′ + 𝑞𝑃′′2𝑃′ + 𝑞𝑃′′ < 0.                        (𝐴1) 
Given the assumptions on the demand function, we have 𝑞𝑀(0) > 0 and 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) = 0 at 
𝐾 = 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2).  The continuity and monotonicity of 𝑞𝑀(∙) imply that there is a unique 
𝐾�𝑀  such that 𝐾�𝑀 = 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾�𝑀/2) . Since the function 𝐾𝑀 − 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾𝑀/2)  is 
increasing in 𝐾𝑀, we conclude that 𝐾𝑀 ≤ 𝑞𝑀((𝑛 − 2)𝐾𝑀/2) if and only if 𝐾𝑀 ≤ 𝐾�𝑀.  ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 3: It follows from Proposition 1 in De Francesco and Salvadori (2009) and 
Lemma 2.  ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 4: From (2) we know that the slope of the Cournot best-response function 
𝑞𝑖(∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ) is strictly between −1 and 0.  Then using the Taylor series we obtain: 
𝑞𝑖 �(𝑛 − 2)𝐾�� = 𝑞𝑖 �(𝑛 − 1)𝐾�� + 𝑑𝑞𝑖(∙)𝑑 ∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 �−𝐾�� < 2𝐾�.             (𝐴2) 
Since the function 2𝐾 − 𝑞𝑖((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) is increasing in 𝐾, (A2) and the definition of 𝐾�𝑀 then 
imply 𝐾�𝑀 < 2𝐾�.  ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 1: It follows from comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 using Lemma 4.  ∎  
Derivation of 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝𝐿 in (5) and (6): The value of 𝑝𝐻 is equal to the profit-maximizing 
price of firm M (the firm with the largest capacity) when it allows its rivals to undercut and 
produce at their capacities ((𝑛 − 2)𝐾).  Hence we have (5).  
To derive (6), note that firm M may or may not be capacity-constrained at 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐿; that is, 2𝐾 may be less than or greater than 𝐷(𝑝𝐿).  This ambiguity exists when 𝑛 = 3.  But in the 
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case where 𝑛 ≥ 4 , (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 ≥ 2𝐾  implies 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) ≤ 𝑃(2𝐾) . Then 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝𝐻 <
𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) implies 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑃(2𝐾) and hence 𝐷(𝑝𝐿) > 2𝐾.  Taking into consideration both 
possibilities, we write firm M’s expected profit at 𝑝 = 𝑝𝐿 as 𝑝𝐿min {2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)}.  Equation 
(6) is obtained from the condition 𝑝𝐿 min{2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} = 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾].  ■  
Proof that 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) < 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝𝐻 < 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾): Since Firm M would face a residual demand of 0 
if it charges a price above 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾), such a high price cannot be a solution to (5).  Hence 
𝑝𝐻 < 𝑃((𝑛 − 2)𝐾) .  It follows from 𝑝𝐿 min{2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} = 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾]  that 
𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝𝐻 .  To prove that 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) , note that 𝐾 > 𝐾�𝑀/2  implies 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 −2)𝐾] > 2𝐾𝑃(𝑛𝐾).  Then 2𝐾𝑝𝐿 ≥ 𝑝𝐿 min{2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} > 2𝐾𝑃(𝑛𝐾).  Thus 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾).  ■  
Proof of Proposition 2:  From Lemmas 1, 3 and 4, we know that for 𝐾 in this range, the 
merger turns a pure strategy equilibrium into a mixed strategy equilibrium.  The post-merger 
prices are strictly higher because 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾).  ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3:  From Lemmas 1 and 3, we know that for 𝐾 in this range, the merger 
turns a pure strategy equilibrium into a mixed strategy equilibrium.  From 
𝑝𝐿 min{2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} = 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] > 0 we know that 𝑝𝐿 > 0.  ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4(i): To show that 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝ℎ, note that 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝ℎ are solutions to the 
problem max𝑝𝑝 ∙ (𝐷(𝑝) − 𝜅), with 𝜅 = (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 and (𝑛 − 1)𝐾.  Conducting comparative 
statics on the first-order condition of this optimization problem, we find:  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝜅
= 12𝐷′(𝑝) + 𝑝𝐷′′(𝑝) < 0.                               (𝐴3) 
Since (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 < (𝑛 − 1)𝐾, (A3) implies that 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝ℎ.  
We use (3) and (6) to prove that 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑝𝑙.  In the proof of Proposition 5 below, we show 
that 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] > 2𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾].  Then using (3) and (6) we find:  
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𝑝𝐿 = 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾]min {2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} ≥ 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾]2𝐾 > 2𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾]2𝐾 = 𝑝𝑙. (𝐴4) 
■ 
Proof of Proposition 4(ii): We use 𝐹 to denote a firm’s mixed strategy before the merger, and 
𝐹𝑀 and 𝐹𝑂 to denote the mixed strategy of the merged entity and an outsider, respectively.  
When characterizing the equilibrium mixed strategies, we use the fact that a firm’s expected 
profit is constant and maximized at each price level 𝑝 when the rivals play the equilibrium 
strategies. This implies 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖,𝐹𝑛−1) = 𝐹𝑛−1𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾) + (1 − 𝐹𝑛−1)𝑝𝐾 = 𝑝𝑙𝐾  in 
the pre-merger equilibrium.  From this equation we obtain the pre-merger equilibrium strategy 
of each firm presented in (4).  
For the post-merger equilibrium strategies 𝐹𝑀  and 𝐹𝑂 , we are able to derive explicit 
solutions in only a subset of cases.  Fortunately, we do not need the complete set of solutions in 
order to prove our result. Since we have established that 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝ℎ  and 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑝𝑙 , we can 
conclude that 𝐹𝑀  and 𝐹𝑂 stochastically dominate F for any price below 𝑝𝐿  or above 𝑝ℎ .  
What remains to be proven is that this result holds for any price in the range (𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝ℎ).   
We will proceed as follows.  We will first characterize the post-merger equilibrium mixed 
strategies.  Then we will compare the equilibrium strategies before and after the merger. 
Depending on the magnitude of 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾) relative to 𝑝𝐻 and 𝑝𝐿, there are three cases we 
must consider.  
Case 1: 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾) > 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝𝐿.   
The expected profits of firm M and each outsider can be written as:  
𝜋𝑀(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = � [𝐹𝑂𝑛−2𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾) + 2(1 − 𝐹𝑂𝑛−2)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑀𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐿
= 2𝑝𝐿𝐾;     (𝐴5) 
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𝜋𝑂(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = � [𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾) + (1 − 𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑂𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝐿
= 𝑝𝐿𝐾.   (𝐴6) 
We solve (A5) and (A6) to obtain: 
𝐹𝑀 = 2−(𝑛−3) (𝑛−2)⁄ � (𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−2)⁄   ,    𝐹𝑂 =  � 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−2)⁄ .              (𝐴7) 
Case 2: 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾) > 𝑝𝐿.    
In this case, the expected profits have to be expressed differently depending on whether the 
number of firms exceeds three.  If 𝑛 = 3, the expected profits of firm M and each outsider can 
be written as:    
𝜋𝑀(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = ∫ [𝐹𝑂𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝐾) + 2(1 − 𝐹𝑂)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑀𝑃(2𝐾)𝑝𝐿 + ∫ [𝐹𝑂𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝐾) +𝑝𝐻𝑃(2𝐾)              (1 − 𝐹𝑂)𝑝𝐷(𝑝)]𝑑𝐹𝑀  = 2𝑝𝐿𝐾;                                                                                               (𝐴8)  
𝜋𝑂(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = � [𝐹𝑀𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − 2𝐾) + (1 − 𝐹𝑀)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑂𝑃(2𝐾)
𝑝𝐿
+ � (1 − 𝐹𝑀)𝑝𝐾𝑑𝐹𝑂𝑝𝐻
𝑃(2𝐾) = 𝑝𝐿𝐾. 
 (A9) 
Using the above equations, we obtain 
     𝐹𝑀 = (𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(3𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)) ,    𝐹𝑂 = 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(3𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)) .                                                  (𝐴10) 
for prices in the range 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝 < 𝑃(2𝐾).  (We omit the probability distributions for prices in 
the range 𝑃(2𝐾) < 𝑝 < 𝑝𝐻 as they are not needed for our proof).  Note that (A10) is identical 
to (A7) for 𝑛 = 3.  
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If 𝑛 ≥ 4, the expected profit of firm M can be written as 
𝜋𝑀(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = 2𝑝𝐿𝐾  = ∫ [𝐹𝑂𝑛−2𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾) + 2(1 − 𝐹𝑂𝑛−2)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑀𝑃((𝑛−1)𝐾)𝑝𝐿   +∫ [𝐹𝑂𝑛−2𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾) + (𝑛 − 2)𝐹𝑂𝑛−3(1 − 𝐹𝑂)𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 3)𝐾) +𝑝𝐻𝑃((𝑛−1)𝐾)2�1 − 𝐹𝑂𝑛−2 − (𝑛 − 2)𝐹𝑂𝑛−3(1 − 𝐹𝑂)�𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑀,                              (A11) 
where 𝐹𝑂𝑛−2 is the probability that firm M offers the highest price, and (𝑛 − 2)𝐹𝑂𝑛−3(1 − 𝐹𝑂) 
is the probability that it offers the second highest price.  The expected profit of an outsider can 
be expressed as:  
𝜋𝑂(𝐹𝑀,𝐹𝑂) = 𝑝𝐿𝐾 = ∫ [𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾) + (1 − 𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3)𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑂𝑃�(𝑛−1)𝐾�𝑝𝐿            +∫ [𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3𝑝 × 0 + (𝑛 − 3)𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−4(1 − 𝐹𝑂)𝑝(𝐷(𝑝) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾)𝑝𝐻𝑃((𝑛−1)𝐾)   
    +(1 − 𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3 − (𝑛 − 3)𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−4(1 − 𝐹𝑂))𝑝𝐾]𝑑𝐹𝑂,                      (A12) 
where 𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−3 is the probability that this outsider offers the highest price, and (𝑛 − 3)𝐹𝑀𝐹𝑂𝑛−4(1 − 𝐹𝑂) is the probability that this firm offers the second highest price and firm 
M offers an even lower price.  Solving (A11) and (A12), we find that 𝐹𝑀 and 𝐹𝑂 are the same 
as (A7) for prices in the range 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝 < 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾).   
Case 3: 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾). 
In this case, we do not need an explicit solution for 𝐹𝑀 and 𝐹𝑂 because 𝑃�(𝑛 − 1)�𝐾 >
𝑝ℎ implies that 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑝ℎ, from which we know that 𝐹𝑀 and 𝐹𝑂 strictly dominate 𝐹 
stochastically at first order.  
Therefore, we need to consider only Cases 1 and 2 to complete the proof.  Recall that the 
relevant range of prices is 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝 < 𝑝ℎ and that 𝑝ℎ < 𝑃((𝑛 − 1)𝐾).  Thus, the relevant 
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post-merger equilibrium strategies are given by (A7).  We want to show that 𝐹 > 𝐹𝑀 and 
𝐹 > 𝐹𝑂 for prices in the range 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝 < 𝑝ℎ.  
Next, we proceed to prove that 𝐹 > 𝐹𝑂.  Here we use the fact that the exponential function 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥 is decreasing in 𝑥 for 𝑎 ∈ (0, 1).  Note that 1 (𝑛 − 2)⁄ > 1 (𝑛 − 1)⁄  and that in 
(A7), 
0 < 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾
𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)) < 1                                            (𝐴13) 
for 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝ℎ).  Thus, we have  
𝐹𝑂 =  � 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−2)⁄ < � 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−1)⁄ .          (𝐴14) 
To complete the proof, we need to prove that 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑙 > 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿).  This can be done by 
noting that 𝐹(𝑝ℎ) = 1 > 𝐹𝑂(𝑝ℎ) implies  (𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙)𝐾
𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)) = 1 > 2(𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝)).                                  (𝐴15) 
From (A15) we obtain 𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝑙 > 2(𝑝ℎ − 𝑝𝐿).  Since the difference (𝑝 − 𝑝𝑙) − 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿) 
decreases in 𝑝, we have 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑙 > 2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿) for any 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝𝐿 ,𝑝ℎ).  The latter implies 
�
2(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝐾
𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−1)⁄ < � (𝑝 − 𝑝𝑙)𝐾𝑝(𝑛𝐾 − 𝐷(𝑝))�1 (𝑛−1)⁄ = 𝐹.          (𝐴16) 
From (A14) and (A16) we conclude that 𝐹 > 𝐹𝑂 for 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝𝐿 ,𝑝ℎ).  
Finally, it can be seen from (A7) that 𝐹𝑂 > 𝐹𝑀  for all 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝𝐿 ,𝑝ℎ).  Therefore, we 
conclude that 𝐹 > 𝐹𝑀 for prices in the same range.  ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 5: We will prove that the merger is profitable for both firm M and each 
outsider in all three cases considered in Propositions 2, 3 and 4.  In the case where 𝐾�𝑀/2 <
𝐾 ≤ 𝐾�, each firm earns a profit of 𝑃(𝑛𝐾)𝐾 before the merger.  After the merger, the expected 
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profit of an outsider is equal to 𝑝𝐿𝐾, which is higher than its pre-merger profit because 
𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(𝑛𝐾) .  The two insiders, on the other hand, earn an expected profit of 
𝑝𝐿min {2𝐾,𝐷(𝑝𝐿)} after the merger.  It is clear that the merger is profitable for the insiders if 2𝐾 ≤ 𝐷(𝑝𝐿) .  In the case where 2𝐾 > 𝐷(𝑝𝐿) , we have 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(2𝐾) .  Recall that the 
expected profit of firm M is also equal to 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾].  Optimization by firm M 
regarding pH yields the first-order condition 𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 + 𝑝𝐻𝐷′(𝑝𝐻) = 0 , which 
implies 𝐷(𝑝𝐻) + 𝑝𝐻𝐷′(𝑝𝐻) = (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 > 0 .  Noting that 𝐷 + 𝑝𝐷′  is the first-order 
derivative of 𝑝𝐷 and that 𝑝𝐷 is concave, we have  𝑑[𝑝𝐷(∙)] 𝑑𝑝⁄ > 0 for 𝑝 < 𝑝𝐻.  Then 
𝑝𝐿 > 𝑃(2𝐾), implies 𝑝𝐿𝐷(𝑝𝐿) > 𝑃(2𝐾)2𝐾, which, in turn, is greater than 𝑃(𝑛𝐾)2𝐾.  Thus, 
the merger is profitable for the insiders.  
In the case where 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ ≤ 𝐾 < 𝐷(0)/(𝑛 − 2), each firm earns zero profit before 
the merger.  The merger is profitable for both the insiders and outsiders because 𝑝𝐿 > 0 
implies that each firm earns a positive profit after the merger.  
In the case where 𝐾� < 𝐾 < 𝐷(0) (𝑛 − 1)⁄ , the expected profit of an outsider rises from 𝑝𝑙𝐾 
to 𝑝𝐿𝐾.  Hence the merger is profitable for each outsider.  The expected profit of the two 
insiders is equal to 2𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾] before the merger and 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] 
after the merger. Since 𝑝𝐻  is the solution to max𝑝𝑝[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] , we have 
𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] > 𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] .  Note that 𝐷(𝑝ℎ) < 𝑛𝐾  implies that 
𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾 > 2[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) − (𝑛 − 1)𝐾].  Hence 𝑝𝐻[𝐷(𝑝𝐻) − (𝑛 − 2)𝐾] > 2𝑝ℎ[𝐷(𝑝ℎ) −(𝑛 − 1)𝐾].   ∎ 
 
 
